



LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT ■ USE OF FORCE ■ HOMELAND SECURITY ■ FUNDING
SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT ■ NARCOTICS ■ EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ■ TECHNOLOGY

ANSWERING THE CALL

Presented by The Performance Institute
and The Police Policy Studies Council

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT & FIRST RESPONDERS
SUMMER 2007



Surviving
the Nightshift

Also Inside...

Contagious Fire ■ Emerging Threats at DHS ■ Product Review ■ Law Enforcement Strategies

The 2007 National Summit on

Campus Security

July 30–31, 2007 | Arlington, VA

- ✓ **Protect Students and Campus Personnel**
- ✓ **Update Your Emergency Response Plan**
- ✓ **Effectively Collaborate with all Community Members on Campus Security**
- ✓ **Develop Effective Vulnerability Assessment, Prevention, and Mitigation Strategies**

Special “Answering the Call” Discount!

Register by calling 703-894-0481



ANSWERING THE CALL

Editor In Chief

Ian Faigley

Faigley@PerformanceWeb.org

Senior Editors

Steven Ashley

Steve@theppsc.org

Thomas J. Aveni

Tom@theppsc.org

Creative Director

Nicole Cathcart

Cathcart@PerformanceWeb.org

Senior Designer

Cheri Rogenhofer

Rogenhofer@PerformanceWeb.org

For Subscriptions Visit

www.PerformanceWeb.org/Subscribe

The Performance Institute

1515 N. Courthouse Road,
Suite 600

Arlington, VA 22201

Phone: 703-894-0481

Fax: 703-894-0482

www.PerformanceWeb.org

ANSWERING THE CALL is
a joint production from The
Performance Institute's Law
Enforcement Development
Center and The Police Policy
Studies Council



PAGE . 8 Cover Story: Surviving the Nightshift

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 4** **Editor's Letter Page**
- 5** **The Fuzz Buzz**
- 8** **Cover Story** Surviving the Nightshift
- 16** **Contagious Fire:** Fact & Fiction
- 20** **Emerging Threats & Preparedness at DHS**
An Interview with Kevin "Spanky" Kirsch
- 23** **Product Review** The First Light "Liberator"
- 28** **Essential Law Enforcement Strategies**
- 32** **The Parting Shot**



The Performance Institute

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Colleague,

Ten to twenty years ago, much of the discussion in the news and surrounding law enforcement community was the superior firepower and arsenals possessed and used by criminals. The 'Cop Killer' bullets, automatic weapons and other weapons created a playing field where police were at a clear disadvantage. Over the past several years, with the threat of domestic terrorism looming, agencies have slowly caught up and added new weapons into their arsenal, such as tasers, to handle a wide variety of situations and threats.

Police officers are now facing another gap with criminals--information. With the rise of the internet and increased speed and ease of communication, criminals such as sex offenders and drug dealers can easily coordinate efforts across jurisdictions and even countries. Criminal enterprises can now spread across countries, types of crime, and are able to appear in any community, no matter how small or isolated. Many gangs now have international websites, to disseminate gang signs and current news to members.

This new paradigm of crime is a huge advantage for criminals when compared to the current state of law enforcement and first response in the United States. Jurisdictions at the federal, state and local levels have long been territorial by nature, and reluctant to share some types of information. Different types of first responder agencies even in the same jurisdiction sometimes struggle to see where they have a shared mission for protecting the community.

Recent disasters in the 20th century have raised many questions about the current state of readiness for first responder agencies to work together effectively. Steps have been taken to both fund and prepare agencies for these major events.


There must also be a focus placed on regular information sharing and collaboration amongst agencies. Sex offender movements and behavioral patterns must be shared amongst jurisdictions, to aid in the tracking of those former offenders. Purchases of large amounts of ephedrine based products should be shared with other jurisdictions to make sure everyone is on the lookout for meth labs.

Crime in its many forms will always likely be present in our society, at least until we find some utopian structure for governing man. There will never be a time when natural disasters cease. Because of this, law enforcement must be ever vigilant to be aware of changes in crime patterns and new strategies for dealing with crime and major events. More importantly, first responders must examine their agencies and improve their structures for sharing best practices, information and resources with other agencies--in their jurisdiction and beyond.

The Performance Institute and The Police Policy Studies Council work with law enforcement agencies from across the country, from small jurisdictions to federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigations. We have learned three very valuable lessons. First, that the vast majority of jurisdictions deal with many of the same pressing issues- recruiting, homeland security, the rise of gangs and crystal meth, sex offender management, etc. No jurisdiction is safe from concerns about all these issues. Second, no first responder agency has all the answers to crime, homeland security, and disaster management. Third, that every first responder agency in the United States would be more effective in achieving its mission had it access to more information.

This Journal does not assume itself to provide all the answers, but Answering the Call is founded upon the basic principle that every additional piece of knowledge and information available to the first responder community will improve their ability to keep America safe and achieve their mission.

Sincerely,



Ian Faigley, The Performance Institute



CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL, HIGHWAY PATROLS, AND POLICE AGENCIES NEED TO STAY VIGILANT

In the years following 9/11 a massive amount of resources has been invested to prepare officers and agencies to combat and prevent acts of terrorism and to stop terrorists from entering our country: As a result, airports and ports have become a key focus for improved protection.

While illegal drug enforcement was not forgotten, it was not funded at the same levels or given the same emphasis. Couple this with the emphasis on airport security and drug smugglers have become more brazen in using our highways and roads to transport large amounts of drugs, both domestically and internationally.

Many drugs enter the United States from Mexico through Florida, Texas and California. Those drugs are brought over by a variety of means,

mainly hidden in vehicles. With much of the emphasis now on explosives and terrorists, it must fall on the cooperation of multiple agencies in these border states to be on the lookout for drug trafficking.

As of now, the DEA estimates that only approximately 6 percent of the drugs entering this country are intercepted— the rest end up reaching their destination users. Drug abuse is an epidemic in this country, one that is just as dangerous as external terrorists. Additionally, proceeds from illegal drug sales fund many of the terrorists and explosives we are trying to keep outside of our borders. Law enforcement agencies must be vigilant to ensure our country is not only safe from terrorists, but also illegal drugs.


RUDY GIULIANI'S APPROACH TO LAW ENFORCEMENT

Presidential candidate and former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani loves numbers. Many of his issue stances are based on numbers and statistics. And his numbers don't lie especially regarding law enforcement. During his time as mayor of New York crime dropped precipitously from the previous administration— over half in overall crime and over 2/3 in murders. Giuliani credits a system of crime mapping, and more importantly, measurable goals and outcomes that he demanded of all precincts in New York. As Peter Drucker famously stated, "What gets measured gets done."

According to Giuliani, "You get what you measure. If you don't have measurement standards, government is out of control. I imposed these measurement standards on 23, 24, 25 city agencies. In almost every case, it meant major change in their ability to deliver performance."

Measuring performance can be a difficult and daunting task for law enforcement agencies. One issue is that crime rates have a variety of causes, many of which aren't directly controlled by law enforcement such as economics, jail sentences and community make-up. Tracking numbers does make everyone accountable, and outcome goals and measures can be tempered to attempt to account for the uncontrollable variables. Though this is not a catch-all solution, measuring and gauging performance is essential to improving the performance of law enforcement agencies.

SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIME LEVELS DECLINED SINCE 1993



The measures of serious violent crime come from two sources of data:

The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), a household survey ongoing since 1972, that interviews about 134,000 persons age 12 and older in 77,200 households each year about their victimizations from crime. The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) collects information on crimes and arrests reported by law enforcement authorities to the FBI.

Although each measure is different, both the NCVS and the UCR show that serious violent crime levels declined in recent years. For a discussion of UCR and NCVS trends that use this data, see "True Crime Stories? Accounting for Differences in our National Crime Indicators" from Chance by BJS staff members, Michael R. Rand and Callie Marie Rennison.

The measures are:

Total serious violent crime

The estimated number of homicides of persons age 12 and older recorded by police plus the number of rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults from the victimization survey whether or not they were reported to the police.

Victimizations reported to the police

The estimated number of homicides of persons age 12 and older recorded by police plus the number of rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults from the victimization survey that victims said were reported to the police.

Crimes recorded by the police

The number of homicides, forcible

rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults included in the Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI excluding commercial robberies and crimes that involved victims under age 12.

Arrests for violent crimes

The number of persons arrested for homicide, forcible rape, robbery or aggravated assault as reported by law enforcement agencies to the FBI.

PREPARING FOR TERRORIST USE OF EXPLOSIVES

Law enforcement, first responder, and aviation security officials in the Los Angeles area recently came together to study the effects of explosives by terrorists and how best to be prepared for these types of incidents. Critical to preparations for the use of explosives is threat awareness, which is aided by information sharing by all agencies.

Currently, of critical concern is transportation besides airports. Since 9/11, airport security has tightened up considerably, whereas other forms of transit such as buses, trains and subways have experienced little

additional preparation. These so-called 'soft targets' are the most likely targets for the next wave of terrorist incidents.

Officials in the exercises and training learned mainly about the very tiny amount of explosives needed to cause a major explosion. Even the materials within a shoe such as the one Richard Reid was wearing contain enough power to rip through the wall of a vehicle and paralyze it. For a bus on a busy highway, this could easily cause many fatalities, and induce a large amount of panic.

Don't Lose Your Top Performing Emergency
Medical Personnel to Other Agencies!

THE 2007 NATIONAL SUMMIT ON

RECRUITMENT & RETENTION OF PARAMEDICS



August 9-10, 2007
Arlington, VA



Recruit and Retain Quality Emergency Medical Personnel

Equip Yourself and Your Agency with Tested Retention Strategies

Implement Successful Strategies to Attract High-Quality Applicants

Retain High Quality and Expensively Trained Paramedics

Special "Answering the Call" Discount!

Register by calling 703-894-0481

www.PerformanceWeb.org/Paramedics



officer.com
The Source for Law Enforcement

Surviving the Nightshift

By

Thomas J. Aveni, MSFP and Edward Gidnig, OD (Part Three)

The Police Policy Studies Council

Part One of Three-Part Series

Introduction

It's approximately 1 a.m., and you're working the midnight shift in an area of your city that is notorious for violent crime. A serial rapist has been stalking women in this area in recent months and more recently has taken his brazen acts to the next level: forcibly entering the homes of elderly women he has determined to be living alone. This night brings you on a collision course with a subject lurking in a dark alley who fits the physical description of the perpetrator.

Upon seeing your squad car slow to a stop, the subject bolts farther into the alley. You exit your vehicle and initiate an unnerving foot chase into the darkness, initiating pursuit before you have the chance to radio your position to dispatch.

Suddenly, without warning, and under light conditions affording minimal situational clarity, the subject seems

to stop and turn toward you with an object in his right hand. With minimal distance and no available cover between yourself and the suspect, you discontinue your forward momentum to draw and fire your handgun.

Faster than you can remember doing so on the firing range, you've drawn and fired with what seems to be decisive effect. As you radio your situation to dispatch, you begin to try to unravel the ambiguity of this fateful low-light encounter.

You've handcuffed the suspect and checked his vital signs. He appears to be deceased from a single gunshot wound to his chest. As you survey the surrounding area, looking intensely for his weapon, you gasp as you discover that the object that the suspect had been holding in his right hand was in fact a mobile phone.

Are such "mistake-of-fact" shootings an uncommon occurrence? Unfortunately, they're not as uncommon as we'd like them to be.

From what we now know, they are much more likely to occur at night, under light conditions that foster ambiguity. While we all have an intuitive sense for how physiologically ill-prepared we are for performing routine tasks at night, we may not comprehend fully the depth, diversity or criticality of the related occupational safety issues.

Even a casual glance at officers' most egregious errors shows ample evidence that the diminished lighting and fatigue associated with working at night are common elements in many cases. The extent to which this is true is difficult to quantify since the necessary supportive data tends to be fragmented and hard to obtain.

Further complicating any analysis is the fact that human errors potentially associated with the debilitating effects of shift-work also can happen when officers are working or driving home during daylight hours. The accidents and judgmental errors that occur by night might have their roots of causation embedded in the schedules we keep, and some solutions will lie in our ability to adapt to them.

FEATURES



When diminished light-related mishaps occur, many agencies appear ill-equipped to determine and address causation or cure. How can this be? Knowing the extent to which occupational safety is influenced by the hours officers work, why do we continue to see so few training and equipment resources allocated to address the most critical and salient issues?

Darkness, Vision and Error

Vision is a complex process, and much of how it works isn't clearly understood. It is a neurological process that begins with what our eyes sense about our surroundings. The eyes gather the light energy (photons) that illuminates people and objects and then transmit that energy to the brain through a neurochemical transduction process. The brain ultimately translates this neurochemical data stream and then interprets what it all means. Simply put, light enables the complex visual/cognitive process. Without light, there is no vision.

The extent to which we take adequate light for granted is driven home quickly

when we attempt to navigate at night. We find ourselves driving more slowly at night to stay within the minimal reaction distance allowed by our car headlights. This is most evident on rural roads where streetlights and other artificial lighting (e.g., from business establishments) are not readily available. Since the reflectors in our car headlamps are focused for driving in a straight line, we have minimal ability to see animals emerging onto the roadway from our periphery. This is but one example of how compressed and diminished our visual capabilities are at night. Many of the tasks that we regularly perform in policing become much more complex at night, and our equipment and training seldom prepares us for the challenges associated with adverse lighting.

The complex cognitive process that perhaps best defines what we think we see is one that is driven by our ability to discern the size, shape, color and texture of objects we focus upon. Our ability to discriminate the difference between a handgun and a

mobile phone is a much more complex process than we tend to think it is.

The size, shape, color and textures of some handguns may be somewhat similar to the size, shape, color and texture of many cell phones. As ambient light diminishes, our ability to detect the dissimilarity between cell phone and handgun becomes difficult. In fact, it becomes so difficult that we begin to start placing more discriminatory emphasis on the orientation and the context in which the object is being held.

For instance, imagine that an officer is dispatched to the scene of a late-night armed robbery in-progress and quickly encounters someone fitting the general description of the armed robber running away into a poorly lit area. The officer may well make a threat determination based more upon the orientation and context in which the suspect is holding an object in his hand than from the ability to discern exactly what that object is. If the object he is holding appears metallic and shiny and it is held in a manner

consistent with that of a handgun, given the situational context, the officer likely will “see” a gun. Whether it is or isn’t a gun likely will be determined after shots are fired, or after the suspect has complied with verbal commands to drop the object.

The fact that most lethal police confrontations occur at night has been well documented for many years. Also well established is the fact that most of the officers feloniously slain every year are slain during evening and night tours of duty. Less documented but just as troubling is the fact that 75% percent of the cases in which officers mistakenly shoot unarmed subjects involve low-light conditions. Indeed, “officer survival” becomes a multi-dimensional proposition, and the ambiguous world in which many critical decisions are made under low-light conditions should be unsettling to all sworn to protect and serve. Solutions to the problems briefly highlighted in this introduction don’t lie in poorly adapted military doctrine, or in knee-jerk equipment purchases. Our ability to enhance the occupational safety of police officers will reflect a deeper consideration of the complexities, demands and expectations that are unique to our profession.

Part Two of Three-Part Series **Shedding Light on Light**

As we established in the first installment of this series, linked above, without light there can be no (unaided) human vision. Light is the enabler of the complex visual/cognitive process. But, how much do we need to know about light? The most concise answer might be that we need to learn enough about the nature of light to be able to accentuate our visual strengths and compensate for our visual limitations in operational settings.

In delving into this topical area it’s important to understand that some degree of technical knowledge is desirable to acquire for a number of substantive reasons. Pursuant to affording officers the most “usable” information, technical information will be limited in nature to what is essential for proper equipment selection and critical threat identification purposes.

What, When or How Do We Define Darkness?

In the most simplistic terms, darkness is measured by the diminishment or absence of light. We determine how dark an area is by measuring how much ambient light we have available. In essence, we don’t measure “darkness,” we determine how dark it is by measuring the amount of light

In essence, we don’t measure “darkness,” we determine how dark it is by measuring the amount of light available.

available. And, since light diminishes in intensity within surprisingly short distances, “adequate” lighting is almost always determined by one’s proximity to the most intense and immediate light source.

To illustrate this point, attempt to read a newspaper or magazine directly under a 75-watt light bulb. At a distance of 19 inches, under a bare bulb (no lampshade or bulb enclosure),

the 25 foot-candles afforded by that bulb at that distance will enable most people to read the text on a typical newspaper page. However, at a distance of just 7 feet, the light measured from that same 75-watt bulb is now just 2.5 foot-candles, and many people will experience difficulty reading text at that light level. At 36 feet, the measured intensity of light from that bulb is just .055 foot-candles, and even large, bold text would be impossible for most to read at that light level. The occupational safety implications of this phenomenon are many, and most tend to be significant.

Illumination follows an “inverse square” law. For example, for any given reading, if the light meter is held twice as far away from the light, the meter will read only one fourth as much light intensity; if the light meter is held half as far away from the light, the meter will read four times as much.

When does diminished lighting begin to have serious occupational consequences? To some extent, that determination is dependent upon an individual’s age, diet, and overall health traits. Having said this, we’ll find occupationally significant visual impairment at light levels that most officers wouldn’t expect to be problematic. How much we can’t “see” at lower light levels isn’t always the source of flawed decision-making. The diminished quality of what we do see is often what has critical task significance.

Understanding Light Energy

As you undoubtedly learned in grade school, light has a finite velocity but travels at a speed difficult to comprehend. In a vacuum, the speed of light is 186,282 miles per second! As a frame of reference, it takes less than three seconds for a radio for a radio transmission traveling at the speed of light to travel to the moon and back.

FEATURES

Light is often referred to as electromagnetic radiation. Okay, that's not a common phrase in police lexicon. However, too often when we use the word "light" our intent is to suggest "optical light," which roughly approximates the radiation visible to our eyes. Visible light is a small fraction of a much larger electromagnetic spectrum. For the sake of convenience, we can divide this spectrum up into different categories; gamma-rays, X-rays, ultraviolet, optical, infrared, and radio. However, remember, that they are all just light. There are no discernable breaks or hard boundaries in the electromagnetic spectrum. It is merely a continuous range of energy.

Infra-Red (IR) light falls below the lower end of the visible light spectrum for the human eye and is therefore not visible to the naked eye. Infra-Red spectrum light can be utilized through the use of Night Vision Devices (NVD). If used in conjunction with IR illuminators, NVDs even can be employed in scenarios involving indoor operations or those involving exceptionally overcast night skies. We'll examine NVDs in a later segment of this series to gain a better appreciation of their operational value.

Luminance & Illuminance

Luminance is a measure of light coming from an object's surface (in contrast to illuminance, or light output). Unlike illuminance, luminance does not follow a square law, but the area of measurement must be defined. Using a wall as an example, the luminance of the wall is the same whether measured from four feet away or six feet away. Moving closer to or further away from the wall does not change its apparent brightness. The luminance of a particular surface is usually referred to as its "brightness" because it is the quality of brightness that we perceive.

Light Measurement: Addressing Terms of Confusion

Over the last decade, many officers have been faced with confusing photometric terms when attempting to select flashlights for purchase. Many have been rated in terms of "candlepower" while others have been rated in "lumens." In addition, manufacturer's light output ratings were often, shall we say..... overly optimistic?

Candlepower is an old English rating of light output which is measured at the source based on the amount of light emitted by a "church candle." This became a universal standard of light measurement that is still widely used today. It's important to remember that foot-candles are a measurement of light at an illuminated object. Candlepower is a way of measuring how much light is produced by a light bulb, or LED. It is NOT a measure of how much light falls upon an object at a distance.

The term candela is more commonly used today than is candlepower. But, as with the term candlepower, candela is a measure of how much light the bulb produces, measured at the bulb, rather than how much falls upon the thing you want to light up. Evaluating the efficiency of a flashlight rated in candlepower or candela is further complicated by beam focus characteristics. For instance, a flashlight's candlepower is generally enhanced by the degree of focus attributed to its reflector and lens assembly. By using an internal reflector, the flashlight projects all of its bulb's intensity at a given spot, giving it more light intensity and a higher illuminance output rating.

You should also be aware of the fact that a candlepower unit of measure is NOT the same as a foot-candle. Candlepower is a measure of light

taken at the source-not at the target. Foot-candles quantify how much of that light is directed at an object we wish to illuminate.

Be mindful of the fact that flashlight efficiency is influenced greatly by the design and quality of the reflector within it. Since the total output of the system does not take into account the focusing efficiency of the reflector, there is no way cleanly to convert values of peak beam candlepower to lumens.

Operational Light Imperatives

As has been previously noted, a major source of concern under diminished light conditions is that of threat identification. Threat discrimination problems begin to become manifest when ambient light levels fall below 3 foot-candles. Before determining whether your duty flashlight will pass muster at extended distances, consider the limitations of your most potent light platform; your police cruiser. In recent research conducted by the Police Policy Studies Council, high beam (headlights) output of new 2006 Crown Victoria police cars was measured out to 50 feet. Low beam and take-down light intensity was also quantified but will not be addressed directly at this time.

At a distance of 30 feet, high-beam output was measured at 13 foot-candles. This value will vary somewhat from headlight to headlight but represents a good working reference point. Ordinarily, this level of light is adequate light for reliable threat discrimination under more ideal conditions. However, when subjects with dark outer garments were placed directly before the headlights, it quickly became apparent that recognition of a dark (Glock) handgun was extremely tenuous due to the lack of contrast between the

dark handgun and the dark (garment) background. The degree of difficulty was as apparent with the handgun tucked in the subject's waistband as it was when the subject was prompted to completely withdraw the gun from his waistband and hold it against his (dark) sweatshirt. Beyond 30' the task of identifying the handgun became unrealistically difficult.

What were the street implications of this research project? Our consensus was that many vehicular stops typically involve a distance (as measured from the cruiser's headlights to the driver-side door of the subject's car) of roughly 30 or more feet. We also tend to see a great deal of frequency in police assailants utilizing both dark clothing and "black" handguns. In essence, while we take some comfort in suggesting that threat identification problems arise at ambient light levels below 3 foot-candles, we must recognize that the "street equation" can be very different.

Another critical issue these findings impinge upon is police vehicle-stop tactics. Contrary to mainstream thinking, vehicle positioning by night should reflect a substantive departure from daylight protocols. The universally-taught 10-15° (police) vehicle cant (toward the center of the roadway, ostensibly for engine block cover) tends to diminish night-time light intensity by 50% or more when measured at the suspect vehicle's driver-side door.

A critical yet often overlooked post-incident consideration is the documentation of ambient light at a night-time shooting scene. Agencies must make every effort to quantify accurately the ambient light prevalent in any officer-involved shooting that has occurred under low-light conditions. In doing so, agencies

might more reliably determine whether an officer's mistaken belief that a mobile phone was a handgun was an objectively reasonable error under existing light conditions.

1 Aveni, Thomas, "Following Standard Procedure," Law & Order magazine, Vol. 51, No. 8, August 2003

We also tend to
see a great deal
of frequency in
police assailants
utilizing both
dark clothing and
"black" handguns.

Part Three of Three-Part Series
**Low Light Visual Adaptation:
Facts & Misconceptions**

Vision & Perception

Vision is learned by our personal and dynamic experiences of interacting with light energy that is absorbed, refracted or reflected from objects within our environment. Humans must integrate light information with sensory information collected from other organs in order to make sense of a world full of changing light intensities, colors, shapes, smells, textures, sounds and movements. As we mature, we are able to use vision as the dominant system to direct our attention on specific areas that we decide need further understanding and interpretation. When light becomes diminished or absent, our visual system reacts in many different ways that change the way we interpret and

understand our surroundings.

It might be safe to say that most law enforcement officers have had cursory training pertinent to occupational safety under low light conditions. It's also likely that their training included some degree of exposure regarding how the photoreceptors in the eyes adapt to changing light conditions. Unfortunately, much of whatever training law enforcement officers may have had regarding the light adaptive process has either been inaccurate, misleading, or both.

Photopic, Mesopic and Scotopic Vision

To understand how the eye functions under varied light conditions we should first discuss the three operational modes of vision; photopic, mesopic and scotopic. Photopic vision occurs at high light levels and is characterized by (1) heavy dependence upon cone photoreceptors, (2) low light sensitivity, (3) high visual acuity and (4) color vision. Scotopic vision occurs at very low light levels and exhibits 1) use of cone photoreceptors, 2) high light sensitivity, 3) poor acuity and 4) no color vision.

In urban environments, there is often enough ambient light available at night to make true scotopic vision a less frequent occurrence. However, unlit alleys, basements, abandoned buildings, etc. are ubiquitous enough to provide ample opportunity for scotopic vision if the officer finds him/herself unprepared for the occasion.

Under conditions in which street lights, car headlights, store and residential lighting is ever-present, the eye operates in mesopic vision, which is a state of photoreception where the bottom of cone and top of the rod operating levels overlap. Mesopic vision is therefore a more complex

FEATURES

visual process than that of photopic or scotopic vision. It shouldn't be surprising that most night-time accidents occur when the viewer is operating in the mesopic mode rather than in the scotopic visual mode.


Throughout the day we are constantly exposed to different levels of illumination entering our eyes. The size of the pupil helps regulate the amount of light entering our eyes, and the level of dark adaptation allows us to function under diminishing exposures of light. Dark adaptation is the process of changing from cone dominated vision to rod dominated vision. A person becomes dark adapted over a period of 10 to 60. Although dark adaptation begins slowly as we enter a dark environment, for the first 7 minutes after someone enters the dark the fovea is still the most sensitive region of the eye. After this, the rods begin to control visual sensitivity and within 30 minutes, the eye is estimated to be virtually completed dark adapted. Between 30 minutes and 60 minutes there may be a small degree additional dark adaptation. When rods are at their highest dark-adapted state, they are highly sensitive to low levels of ambient light. However, even though the rods set the lower sensitivity boundary, the cones will still respond to a sufficiently bright light. A driver on a dark rural road, for example, may be in a scotopic modality but could still see the color of warning light well ahead if it were intense enough to stimulate cones.

Conversely, light adaptation is an extremely fast event. If you are dark-adapted and are exposed to bright light, light adaptation begins as soon as the luminance levels are high enough to stimulate the cones and begin bleaching the rods. If a person remains in a high luminance environment, full

light adaptation usually is complete within a minute. During the first minute of light adaptation, contrast sensitivity gradually improves. The appearance of images begins to change from the earliest seconds of light adapted images and colors looking "washed out", to full color saturation and contrast of fully light adapted images. As light adaptation continues, the contrast between the light and dark areas becomes more evident and easier to see. Both rods and cones participate in light adaptation, showing a change in sensitivity to lights superimposed upon a dimmer background light environment. In a given tour of duty, the eyes might be forced to adapt to changing light levels many dozens of times. This process is an important but frequently

overlooked issue in many officer-involved shooting cases. An officer's visual and perceptual ability is often determined not only by the scene that he/she was viewing at the time of the incident, but also by what the officer had been viewing previously. For example, an officer transitioning from time expended looking at the bright screen of a cruiser's MDT would likely encounter difficulty if threatened from a darkened area adjacent to the exterior of the patrol car.

Along with color vision loss, when the eye is in the state of scotopia there is a degradation of visual acuity and the ability to see fine detailed images. Visual acuity drops to the range of 20/100 to 20/200. To put this into perspective, a person with daytime



visual acuity of 20/20 can identify a certain sized target object at 200 feet away. If this same person loses visual acuity and now has 20/200 visual acuity, this same person must now move to 20 feet to see the same sized target object. To be more specific, the numerator represents the testing distance measured in feet, so 20/20 and 20/200 both correspond to a 20-foot testing distance. The denominator represents the size of a target that subtends a five-minute arc at a specific viewing distance. Therefore at 20/20 visual acuity, the denominator 20 is the size of the target that subtends a five-minute arc at 20 feet. If the visual acuity is 20/200, 200 is the size of the target that subtends a five-minute arc at 200 feet.

Related to visual acuity degradation during scotopia is the reduction of contrast sensitivity for all spatial frequencies. Since high spatial frequency contrast sensitivity is lowered, it becomes quite difficult to discriminate between light and dark contoured lines.

Appreciating where gray-toned borders begin and end in dark environments requires adequately functioning contrast sensitivity skills. Scotopic vision weakens the ability of humans to distinguish a figure from its background because the contrast sensitivity is inefficient in low levels of light. Of course, once it becomes confusing as to where the figure ends and the background begins, locating and searching for targets becomes tentative. Background surfaces begin to lose their texture gradient identification characteristics, and this in turn further confuses the separation of figure from ground.

Specific Operational Issues

If light levels become low enough so that there is not a target stimuli

bright enough to elicit a specific accommodative response, then the eyes begin to show 'night myopia' (also called 'dark focus'). Although there exists a wide range of individual variance as to the degree of night myopia, most studies show the average degree of night myopia causes the eyes to focus at about one yard in front of the eyes. This means that in darkness, the eyes will not maintain focus at far distances, and tend to focus very close to the observer. If you are trying to see something at a distance more than a few feet in front of you in darkness, your eye's focusing system will not cooperate. This involuntary loss of far focusing control further degrades visual confidence as to what you are observing in darkness.

If you combine some of the visual changes that take place during scotopia, particularly loss of color, reduced visual acuity, and loss of contrast sensitivity and accommodative control, it is easy to imagine that having confidence as to where an object is located, what details define an object, and how an object may be changing, is easily lost. Scotopic vision in comparison to photopic vision presents visual physiological and visual perceptual differences that may be confusing and lead to visual uncertainties.

'Dark focus', sometimes called 'night myopia', is a visual phenomenon that occurs if the eye focusing system has no specific target to focus upon in darkness. While functioning in this dark environment, the eyes tend to focus at a close range within a few feet from the eyes. Any threat identification beyond a few feet away will be blurred because the eyes may be unable to focus at far distances. Understanding the concept of 'night myopia' adds more understanding as to why threat

identification is compromised at night. Low levels of light can lead to other types of visual illusions and physiological changes. These illusions occur because of the lack of visual cues necessary to judge spatial relationships. The so-called, "autokinetic effect" is the visual sensation of perceived movement of a dim light observed while staring at the dim light in a dark environment. The dim light appears to move even though it is stationary or barely moving. The illusion usually disappears when the eyes can view multiple lights. This illusion can be reduced by increasing the brightness of the dim light, or by moving your eyes to different positions of gaze. This effect is often seen while driving at night, particularly while fatigued, as taillights begin to jump around in random motion.

Viewing an unlighted terrain from an elevated vantage point can result in a 'black hole illusion'. This illusion is exaggerated when the horizon is not easily seen. With a scarcity of visual cues necessary for accurate spatial orientation, the observation is similar to looking into an unlit hole. This illusion makes judging distances problematic. Deciding on how far an assailant may be located from an observer is at best a random possibility if the observer is experiencing the 'black hole illusion'. In addition to the obvious forensic implications, there are also many compelling training and equipment concerns embedded within these issues.

In our next installment, we'll be examining "Threat Location & Identification" and "Equipment Selection" issues, and the alarming regularity in which police training seems to have contributed to some of the most egregious problems encountered on the street.

2007 Homeland Security Summit

September 5-7, 2007
Arlington, Virginia

PARTNERING FOR PREPAREDNESS



Implement the Latest NIMS Metrics

Master the Latest NIMS Compliance Metrics to
Maintain Full Funding for Your Initiatives

Enhance All Hazards Emergency Planning

Identify Vulnerabilities and Mitigation Strategies and
Enhance Your Agency's Preparedness Plan to Address
All Potential Threats

Improve Community Preparedness and Response

Improve Preparation, Collaboration, and Communication
for Improved Victim Response

Identify Emerging Security Threats

Protect Critical Infrastructure Systems from the Latest Dangers

Special "Answering the Call" Discount!

Register by calling 703-894-0481



Designed for Police, Fire, Public Health and all First Responders

www.HomelandSecurityWeb.org

CONTAGIOUS FIRE:

Fact & Fiction

By
Thomas J. Aveni, MSFP
The Police Policy Studies Council
December 2006

On the weekend of November 25-26th, after a dramatic NYPD shooting incident, local and national media sources screamed inflammatory headlines, such as; “Fiancée of Slain Groom Calls Police ‘Murderers’”^[i] and “Unarmed Groom Killed By NYPD Bullets.”^[ii] And, so we were told of how seven NYPD officers, members of an undercover team that was investigating drug and prostitution activity at a seedy bar, committed an unspeakable atrocity against three young men who were (by omission of salient background information) characterized as innocent victims of “trigger-happy” police. But, in your heart-of-hearts, you know the other side of the story wasn’t being told.

Certainly, provocative actions by the three “unarmed” suspects initiated the tragic series of events that transpired that morning. People who frequent disreputable night clubs, have extensive criminal records, solicit prostitutes, announce (within earshot of police), “Yo, get my gun!” and then use their vehicle as a battering ram against undercover police vehicles, are seldom innocent victims of the dangerous

circumstances that they’ve created. But this article isn’t about placing blame for what transpired that day. It’s about setting the record straight about officer-involved shootings that involve numerous officers in incidents that have been erroneously termed “contagious fire” episodes.

What do we know about incidents in which multiple officers are involved in a gunfight? Unfortunately, what we know is dwarfed by what we don’t know. And that is precisely the reason why so many “experts,” with few facts, have been allowed to offer what are at times outlandish hypotheses about why these incidents often result in tragic consequences. Even the terminology bandied about is problematic, and contributes to even greater misunderstanding. Having admitted this, it would be best to begin establishing acceptable terminology with which to begin examining at this phenomenon in more detail.

“Bunch Shootings”

The genesis of the term “bunch shooting,” as it applies to multiple officer shootings, is unclear. The first time that the author can remember seeing this term used was in a 1992

article ^[iii] that appeared in the Oregonian newspaper – an article that made some oblique references to the fact that officers that fired in “bunches” tended to fire a higher ratio of rounds per officer, per incident. Since the article loosely examined incidents involving an agency that had been transitioning from revolvers to pistols, and which had suspended handgun training for nearly two years due to manpower constraints, it was difficult to discern whether the Portland Police statistics offered a reliable insight into the “bunch shooting” phenomenon.

The Contagious Misnomer

When looking for the wellspring of the term “contagious fire,” we are drawn to the field of clinical psychology. There we find the likely genesis of the term in the phrase “emotional contagion.” An ‘emotional contagion’ is the tendency to feel emotions that are similar to and influenced by those of others. This sounds innocuous enough, right? Not really. This is often cited as being analogous to yelling “fire” in a crowded theater, instigating a stampede of undisciplined, panic-stricken people. Does this analogy best represent the behavior of police when involved in a bunch shooting? There is

FEATURES

a paucity of evidence to support any such conclusion.

“Synchronous Fire”

The term, “synchronous fire,” is gaining acceptance as a label for multiple-officer shootings, and it deserves closer examination. The generic definition of synchronous action is that which occurs or exists at the same time, moving or operating at the same rate. In the real world, synchronous fire generally isn’t what that generic definition would imply. A bystander may hear what he thinks is a steady stream of gunfire, but upon closer examination, we’ll find that some officers fired while others did not, or that some fired their magazines empty while others did not. However, there is another dimension to synchronicity, and it’s one that may be worth embracing.

Swiss Psychologist, Carl Jung, postulated [iv] that “synchronicity” was best described as, “temporally coincident occurrences of acausal events.” Jung spoke of synchronicity as an “acausal connecting principle” (i.e. a pattern of connection that cannot be explained by direct causality). In Jung’s mind, cause-and-effect seemed to have nothing to do with it. Jung explained that synchronicity, while not a matter of coincidence, is the experience of two or more occurrences that are logically meaningful (but inexplicable) to the persons experiencing them. Jung’s definition of a synchronous event could logically explain the phenomenon of parallel events or circumstances that we see in multiple-officer shootings; interconnected in space and time, yet not cleanly connected in causality.

“Mass Reflexive Response”

In 1999, four NYPD “street crimes” unit officers found themselves involved in the tragic mistake-of-fact (low light)

shooting of Amadou Diallo. After mistaking an object in Diallo’s hand for a gun, the four officers fired a total of 41 shots at Diallo, striking him 19 times. Thereafter, a new phrase began creeping into the NYPD lexicon; “mass reflexive response.” The definition that we’re given for “mass reflexive response” is;

“Gunfire that spreads among officers who believe that they, or their colleagues, are facing a threat. It spreads like germs, like laughter, or fear.”

When examining this definition, few would challenge the central part of this definition regarding officer perception of events; “...who believe that they, or their colleagues are facing a threat..” But, when bracketed between the rest of the verbiage (“Gunfire that spreads.....like germs, like laughter, or fear”) this definition becomes problematic.

Additionally this definition is also interchangeable enough to be used verbatim to define “contagious fire,” and it often is. Before you allow this terminology to seduce you, let’s examine the core issues that are routinely overlooked by “experts” and the media.

Lowlight, Multiple-Officer Confrontations

We all recognize the fact that threat identification is extremely problematic under low light conditions. So much so that up to 75%[v] of all police “mistake-of-fact shootings” occur under low light conditions. So what does this have to do with police bunch shootings? The correlation between low light conditions and bunch shootings that end in mistake-of-fact tragedies is quite compelling. Daylight shootings, and even diminished light shootings where facts are clearly established, tend to have far fewer unarmed suspects shot mistakenly. And, when confronting the question about whether we are more concerned about whether the decision to shoot was appropriate or whether the number of rounds fired was “excessive,” it’s quite clear that the root of community outrage originates in why we shoot more than how many rounds that we fire thereafter. A high volume of fire may throw gasoline on the fire, but community outrage is almost always initiated by the perceived lack of justification for using deadly force.

In specific terms, low light conditions contribute to situational ambiguity by obscuring the following



critical issues; The nature of the threat, The origin of the threat, The identity of the threat, The persistence of the threat

As a consequence, often when one officer fires in a multiple officer scenario, it tends to create a compelling influence on other officers before facts and circumstances may have been independently identified by all parties involved. This isn't likely the result of a contagion – it's more accurately portrayed as a manifestation of the uncertainty highlighted above.

Under low light conditions, even after a threat has been neutralized by police gunfire, there often exists residual uncertainty about whether the threat has ceased. This is often reflected in the “over-flow” effect of additional rounds being fired after a threat has been neutralized.

Case studies of bunch shootings that have occurred under low light conditions aren't as ubiquitous as we'd like, but what we do have at our disposal exhibits many common tendencies. There are many cases to cite, but two compelling examples come immediately to mind.

June 3, 1999, on Interstate 80 in Parsippany-Troy Hills, New Jersey, Stanton Crew, was shot and killed by four police officers from several jurisdictions. Police had boxed in his car with their vehicles and he allegedly to escape by maneuvering around them. His driver's license was suspended for lapsed insurance, and as he drove home, a cop tried to pull him over for “driving erratically.” Reportedly afraid that he would not be able to afford the fines for driving an uninsured car, Mr. Crew allegedly sped up, going 70-80 mph for ten miles. He then crossed the median and drove five miles in the other direction before being boxed in.

Police claim they feared that Mr. Crew was going to run them over. Cops fired 27 shots at his car, killing Mr. Crew and wounding his passenger. Though reports stated that police feared Crew's vehicle presented a threat to their safety, after-action analysis suggested that the police units that boxed-in Crew's vehicle found themselves in a crossfire of their own making, with police rounds striking other police vehicles. This likely added to the confusion present as to the degree of threat that Stanton Crew presented. Analysis: Vehicular pursuit, low light conditions, suspect behavior that was perceived to be assaultive, and

Officers, hampered by adverse light conditions where the chase culminated, stated that they saw Parker's hands come together as he exited the vehicle.

possible confusion about the origin of gunfire striking police units, and we have four officers firing 27 rounds at an “unarmed” individual.

February 20, 1998, on Route 195 in Swansea, Massachusetts, at about midnight, an incident occurred in which four officers from two adjoining jurisdictions engaged Richard Parker in a brief vehicular pursuit for what was initially a motor vehicle violation. As Parker lost control of his vehicle at exit 185, he exited his vehicle and had four officers engage him with a total of 50 rounds fired. Six of those 50 rounds strike Parker, but he survives the incident. Officers, hampered by adverse light conditions where the chase culminated, stated that they saw Parker's hands come together as he exited the vehicle. They also stated that they saw something reflective

in his hands. Post-incident analysis indicated that Parker's shiny leather gloves likely misled officers into believing that he had a handgun, as did his physical posture as he exited his vehicle. Analysis: Low light conditions, along with compelling situational and behavioral cues exhibited by the suspect, resulted in 50 rounds being fired by four officers at an “unarmed” suspect in a few brief seconds. Pandemonium, Not “Panic”

Events of May 9, 2005 in Compton, California, were brought into the living rooms of millions of Americans. Captured on video was the aftermath of a 12 minute vehicular chase in which 13 deputies from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department engaged an “unarmed” suspect with over 120 rounds of handgun fire. The suspect, 44-year-old Winston Hayes, was hit only four times and survived. Yet another example of a low light multiple-officer shooting, there was apparent confusion (before any rounds were fired) after one deputy fell near the suspect's moving vehicle. Again we have a low light shooting that likely sprung from confusion and mistake of facts. However, as you watched the deputies fire, with many standing upright without utilization of cover, panic was not outwardly apparent. Was there a “mass reflex” of 13 deputies to fire simultaneous volleys? Or, in the confusion of the night, did 13 deputies make 13 individual errors in judgment? Can one officer's error influence the decision-making of other officers? Absolutely, it happens all of the time. But, this is a far cry from being anything we might liken to an “emotional contagion.”

Influence of Adversary's Weapon
Does the capability of an adversary's weapon have a discernable influence on the volume and efficacy of police gunfire? Absolutely. Observational

FEATURES

research of Los Angeles County shootings (1998-2002) suggested that bunch shootings were three times more likely to involve suspects armed with shoulder weapons (i.e., rifles and shotguns). How critical is that as an incident variable? Anyone watching dramatic video of the 1997 “North Hollywood Shoot-Out” noticed how much distance officers maintained from the two heavily armed and armored suspects (Phillips and Matasareanu) who fired more than 1,100 rounds at many of the more than 350 officers who responded to that call. The suspects were armed with an assortment of fully automatic and semi-automatic weapons that included AK-47 variant rifles, an H&K 91 (.308) and AR15 (.223). Of the hundreds of pistol and shotgun rounds fired by police, the suspects sustained a total of only 40 hits[vi] (Phillips was shot 11 times and Matasareanu

with discipline through their own fears. Emotional contagion? Where? Outwardly, it appears as if each officer experienced his/her own version of hell, more than likely oblivious to everyone else’s personal vision of hell. Mass reflexive response? Generally speaking, officers hunkered down behind cars and concrete walls and fired only when an opportunity presented itself.

Toward A More Global Perspective

Much of the emotional hysteria that we see exacerbated by the media tends to focus on the fact that officers are now issued high-capacity handguns that “encourage” high volumes of police fire. This transition has nudged the number of shots fired per officer, per incident upward, but it has absolutely no bearing on our decision to employ deadly force. In 1973, when NYPD officers were all issued six-shot .38

for the national news outlets, yet NYPD seldom gets a fair shake in the media. At the time of the Sean Bell shooting, December 9, 2006, NYPD had killed a total of 11 suspects. To put NYPD shooting restraint in better perspective, consider that at that same time (12/09/2006), at least 19 people had been killed by police in Philadelphia. Las Vegas, which has about 2,170 police officers, had 12 people shot and killed by police at that same time. In suburban Atlanta’s DeKalb County, police had fatally shot 12 people at the time of the Sean Bell shooting. DeKalb County, with 700,000 residents, is one-tenth the size of the New York City.

Clearly, so much is lost in the emotion and noise generated by special interest groups in the aftermath of a police shooting. If truth is truly the first victim of war, perhaps the same can be said for the media “mugging” of truth in the aftermath of a police shooting. When examining multiple-officer shootings, we tend to see several recurring variables that have profound training and policy implications. However, we see so many dissimilarities in specific officer behaviors that we should avoid succumbing to sweeping generalities. Characterizing officer shooting behaviors as being “contagious” or “reflexive” should be avoided until specific facts and circumstances have been exhaustively evaluated.

- i] <http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/11/27/nyc.shooting.ap/index.html>
- ii] <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/26/national/main2208778.shtml>
- iii] The Oregonian, April 25, 1992, “Shootings: Who, What and How Many”
- iv] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synchronicity>
- v] Aveni, Thomas. “Following Standard Procedure.” Law & Order, Vol. 51, No. 8, August 2003
- vi] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Hollywood_shootout
- vii] <http://www.city-journal.org/html/eon2006-12-04hm.html>

AGGREGATE SYNOPSIS

LOS ANGELES COUNTY OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS† 1998-2002*

| | |
|--|------|
| Shots Fired Per Officer With Only 1 Officer Involved | 3.59 |
| Shots Fired Per Officer With 2 Officers Involved | 4.98 |
| Shots Fired Per Officer With More Than 2 Officers Involved | 6.48 |
| Hit Ratio In OIS With 1 Only Officer Involved | 51% |
| Hit Ratio In OIS With 2 Officers Involved | 23% |
| Hit Ratio In OIS With More Than 2 Officers Involved | 9% |

* At the time this was originally published, shooting data for 2002 was only available to September 23rd.

† Data provided did NOT include data for incidents where shots fired by officers had no suspect being struck by fire.

was shot 29 times). The body armor worn by the suspects defeated many of the 9mm and buckshot rounds fired at them by police. Greater standoff distances (between police and adversaries) diminish police hit ratios, which in turn tends to invite a greater volume of police fire.

Much was learned from the North Hollywood shootout about police preparedness for similar situations. But, overlooked was the fact that many officers were able to respond

Special revolvers, there were 1.82 fatal police shootings per 1,000 officers; in 2005, there were 0.25 such shootings per 1,000 officers, bringing the absolute number of police shootings down from 54 in 1973 to nine in 2005[vii]. The NYPD’s per capita rate of shootings is lower than many big city departments.

With more than 37,000 uniformed officers, the NYPD is by far the country’s largest police force. Its police shootings often become fodder

Emerging Threats & Preparedness at DHS

An Interview with Kevin “Spanky” Kirsch, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security Director, Office of Special Programs

DHS S&T Directorate, S&T Mission: To protect the homeland by providing Federal and local officials with state-of-the-art technology and other resources

With
Nicole Cathcart
The Performance Institute

What is the role of the Science and Technology Directorate?

We are the Research and Development arm of DHS. So, if they’re looking for a technical solution to a problem, then that’s where S&T is. Now that I tell you that—it’s not about the

you know who you know who you’re supposed to be talking to, a new radio isn’t going to help you.

At the end of the day, I could come up with a great unmanned, flying UFO, but maybe I can’t operate it because of rules coming out of the FAA. You

What are some of the pressing issues you see in ensuring homeland security over the next ten years?

Ten years is kind of difficult...the area we work with is emerging threats. What’s going to be the emerging threat 10 years from now? It certainly won’t be what the emerging threat is today. When I started working there and they said emerging threats would be working for me, I said, “is that like a liquid explosion?” They said, “That’s not emerging.”

Emerging, and a threat that will continue to be a concern over the next couple years, is vehicle-born IEDs, the very things they’re encountering in Iraq. God-willing, someday, when we come back from Iraq, how are we going to deal with that here in the United States—whether one goes off or one doesn’t go off? What is going to be the economic impact and the social impact of even a failed attempt at an IED in Washington, DC?

“Emerging, and a threat that will continue to be a concern over the next couple years, is vehicle-born IEDs, the very things they’re encountering in Iraq. God-willing, someday, when we come back from Iraq, how are we going to deal with that here in the United States—whether one goes off or one doesn’t go off?”

technology. Sometimes we have someone say, “Design a new radio.” Well, you don’t need that. You need to develop the social network. Until

can have technology, but a lot of times the feedback will be legal, political, cultural, ethical...

INTERVIEW

As an example of how we would deal with it in the United States, we can look to four years ago, and two snipers here in DC. People weren't putting fuel in their cars, weren't going to Home Depot, because of two guys running around for three weeks. Pumpkin farms almost went bankrupt as hundreds of school trips to pumpkin farms were cancelled. Homecoming games were cancelled. So, even if no one was shot—and that was a serious situation—even if no one was shot, they still achieved their objective of economic impact. That's one of the things terrorists are trying to do.

Another economic example...the one mad cow incident in Vancouver. Found the cow, destroyed the cow... hundreds of millions of dollars lost for the beef industry, and no one got sick. They found the cow, destroyed the cow—no other cows got mad cow disease. One incident, but what it did to the beef industry...again, that's an example of a natural occurrence of something that could just as easily be done in biotech.

The biggest issue that we're worried about is those IEDs coming into our country. There are debates as to if that will actually happen, how much it will happen, because a lot of the financing for these organizations comes from the United States. So, you have to be careful where you bomb.

What are your staffing challenges at DHS?

They have a general staffing policy at DHS, but you have to remember that they glued together 22 different organizations to create DHS, and there's not a lot of support for something that's coming down from

outside—people have been hiring their own way for years.

The pressing issues are going to be when all this stuff that's going on in Iraq and Afghanistan comes across to the U.S. It's going to be a completely different.

When the conflict in Iraq ends, that's when the conflict comes to the States?

Personally, I think so, because they won't be busy over there. There will be the resources to do that. Where will they actually do it, where they won't affect their funding, which comes from the U.S.? They have to be very careful, since they're not very organized.

What are some ways DHS works with the private sector to improve the capabilities of first responders?

One example in a disaster situation—you'll have people like Cisco, Microsoft, HP working with one another—this is really amazing—they will come across a technical problem in coordination that normally in the private sector would take months to build statements, go through legal council. In case of a disaster, that's all out the window. You have these people sitting in a room and solving a problem in 90 minutes that would otherwise take 5 months. It's called a hastily-formed network. In a disaster situation, that's how we work.

What are some ways local law enforcement can work cooperatively with DHS?

Well, the real money out there is at the state and local level. Airports are spending millions of dollars of their

own money on IED protection. If you could harness that kind of money at the Federal level, say to learn best practices...we could do a better job. Even the National Guard doesn't coordinate very well state-to-state on lessons learned, community exercises that they do, which includes law enforcement, fire fighters.

We have a first responder liaison in Science & Technology, and at the end of the day, no matter what it is, we have to remember that the customer of the customer is the first responder. Even in my area, which is all classified stuff—gouge your eyes out classified—you have got to remember at the end of the day that the thing that you develop that is classified, that comes from DOD sometimes, has to be used by someone who doesn't have a clearance at all. It's one of the biggest hindrances we have between entities.

KEVIN "SPANKY" KIRSCH

is the Director of the Office of Special Programs in the Department of Homeland Security's Science & Technology Directorate. "SPANKY" is a retired Air Force Lt. Col., who started his career as a strategic bomber pilot, having flown both the B-52 and FB-111 aircraft. After his flying assignments, he worked at Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters as Chief of Advanced Weapons Concepts, where he managed a number of nuclear weapons projects. He served a variety of roles with Strategic Command and the Department of Defense before joining DHS.

Special "Answering the Call" Discount!

Register by calling 703-894-0481



The 2007 National Summit on

USE OF FORCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Develop and Implement Proven Policies and Training Procedures for
Use of Force in Your Agency



October 15-16, 2007
Arlington, VA

- ✓ Comply with Federal and National Use of Force Standards
- ✓ Master Force Reporting Requirements to Minimize Your Agency's Risk
- ✓ Examine Appropriate Use of Lethal and Non-Lethal Force
- ✓ Examine New Technology and Training Techniques



officer.com
The Source for Law Enforcement



www.PerformanceWeb.org

THE FIRST LIGHT “LIBERATOR”

By
Thomas J. Aveni, MSFP
The Police Policy Studies Council



Though long acknowledged as a perennial occupational safety problem, law enforcement officers are rarely afforded adequate training in low light techniques and tactics. This isn't just a concern on the firearms range, where what little low light training officers receive takes place. Operating under low light conditions entails a wide range of situational assessment problems that firearms training seldom addresses.

We now know that an average of 25% of all subjects shot by police were unarmed when engaged with deadly force. We also know that of that number, as many as 75% are shot mistakenly under low light conditions. This isn't rocket science. We can't positively identify what we can't see. Worse yet, we are more likely to walk into untenable tactical circumstances when our environmental awareness is diminished. And yet, from the statistical data available, we find that significantly few officers report using a flashlight in lethal confrontations. Understanding why this problem is so prevalent is also not rocket science.

If we were to critically assess the quality of low light equipment and training given to law enforcement officers, we'd have to make some painful admissions. Most of the

adverse light training available is abysmal – it's literally part of the problem – not part of the solution. Why? Because it has typically been as “counter-intuitive” as has been the equipment we've issued officers. Yes, I have some explaining to do.....

Given the average of perhaps 2-hours of low light training that agencies provide officers in any given year, techniques and tactics should reflect a short learning curve and also reflect stress-resistant simplicity. If we were able to teach officers low light (i.e., flashlight) techniques that didn't radically alter the way that they'd employ their handguns - that would be substantively advantageous as well. Techniques that necessitate arm cross-over or that involve the handgun being radically separated from the flashlight are generally far from being intuitive. Consequently, they require an investment of more training hours to achieve basic levels of competence.

That brings us to flashlight design – a likely source of solutions to many of problems noted above. Though the technology we find embedded in duty flashlights has advanced mightily over the last two decades, the form factor, or human interface, has advanced very little. So-called “tube lights,” the cylindrical lights that we were all

weaned on, remain the most ubiquitous specimens in law enforcement – and for good reason. Until recently, we weren't given too many choices. Tube lights have seen modifications that have moved activation switches from near the light head to the tail-cap, thus better “enabling” officers to use some of the worst flashlight techniques (e.g., “Harries,” “Pucket,” “Neck Index,” etc.). In the mid-1990s we saw one major manufacturer (SureFire) introduce a tube light with a tapered barrel (the “6Z”). SureFire now offers similar tube tapering in a variety of products (G2Z, L5, L6 etc.). The tapered tube afforded a “syringe” type hold of the light which enabled officers with larger hands to employ a fairly efficient two-hand hold of the handgun. Not everyone was overly enthused with the tapered barrel approach and light manufacturers began offering a diverse and more affordable line of weapon-mounted lights. But, handgun mounted lights bring their own concerns to the table. Early versions were largely made of

PRODUCT REVIEW

plastic and didn't engender confidence in their resistance to holster wear and other forms of abuse. And holster compatibility was always a problem in itself. Few Level II and III security holsters used to be available for handguns with mounted lights.

SOON, THE LIBERATOR WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE WITH A PULSING STROBE CAPABILITY TO ASSIST IN SUBJECT DISORIENTATION AND CONTROL.

Unholstering the handgun and then mounting the light in an operational environment was always less than desirable. It assumes you'll perceive the need early enough in a situation and have the time and presence of mind to attach the light to your handgun. Attaching a light to loaded handgun, especially when hurried and under stress, seems to tempt Murphy's Law.

Once deployed, the weapon-mounted flashlight has raised concern that it might elicit unintended consequences. Due to the fact that the mounted flashlight is coaxial with the bore of the weapon, when an officer searches with his/her weapon-mounted light everything being searched with the light is also being swept by the weapon's muzzle. If an officer is startled under low light conditions (quite common) while the muzzle is sweeping things perhaps not yet certain, there is obvious potential for problems.

So what alternatives do we have?

In 2004 a new and innovative flashlight company, First Light, arrived on the scene without too many people noticing. In April of 2006 when their new "Liberator" model was made publicly available, few people may

have noticed. However, that may be about to change since the Liberator represents a quantum leap in the form factor of flashlights. Since it straps to the palm of the support hand with the flashlight body situated on the back of the hand, it largely leaves that hand

free to negotiate other chores – or assist the shooting hand in delivering more accurate fire. The light head, once adjusted to the individual user, points where the index finger points – and pointing a flashlight doesn't get any more "intuitive" than that! Activation of the light is effortlessly performed by the thumb of the support hand.

The Liberator is a well-conceived and well-made product. Its LED array and reflector afford up to 80 lumens of peak lighting from two CR123 batteries. It can be operated either intermittently or in a "constant-on" mode by way of the "Control Panel" accessed by the support thumb. You may also place



the light in a "Lock-Out" mode so that the light isn't inadvertently activated when not needed. Soon, the Liberator will also be available with a pulsing strobe capability to assist in subject disorientation and control.

I received my first sample of the Liberator nearly ten months ago and have had ample opportunity to see what it can do in that amount of time. The bedrock principle that this product is designed upon is affording one the ability to "wear" the light while concurrently being able to drive a car, climb a ladder, frisk subjects, handcuff subjects, deploy a firearm effectively, and of course have adequate visual capability to ascertain friend from foe. Does it do all that it was designed to do? That's what we set out to determine.

Protocols

Employing a group of 21 seasoned firearms instructors, a simple battery of simple yet common tasks were undertaken and compared. If the Liberator lived up to its billing we should be able to execute common police tasks without much if any encumbrance when wearing the Liberator. Due to time constraints, test subjects were given a very brief orientation to the Liberator regarding fit, function and light alignment. It is believed that a better orientation would have improved results substantially. But, this "worst case scenario" is probably not unlike the way that many officers might be issued a Liberator; with very little formal orientation and training.

"Shot-Break" drills were initiated with handguns holstered and flashlights pre-deployed. The "Qualification" component was a simplistic 10-round, low light engagement of targets at 7 and 15 yards, with 5 rounds being fired at each distance. Only hits inside of the central "light bulb" area of the target were scored. The "tube lights" used by each officer were their own lights that they were presumably most experienced with. Subsequently,

PRODUCT REVIEW

officers had a substantive edge in familiarity with the tube lights that they employed.

Observations

Handcuffing without the Liberator (W/O) and with the Liberator went surprisingly well. Not only was the Liberator not an encumbrance

in handcuffing, but many subjects displayed better handcuffing times with the Liberator being worn.

However, this was likely attributable to the fact that many of the officers' handcuffing skills seemed "rusty" and the fact that the Liberator handcuffing procedure was performed AFTER

the empty-hand cuffing was timed. Individual shooter "quirks" became manifest in the marksmanship (Qualification) component of this trial. Some shooters displayed a "broken wrist" grip that tended to cant the light of the Liberator downward. As with all flashlight-assisted shooting, if the light is pointed somewhere other than the

| Officer | Handcuffing W/O | Handcuffing W/ Liberator | Shot Break Tube-Light | Shot-Break Liberator | Qualification Tube-Light | Qualification Liberator |
|-------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1 | 13.95 | 9.43 | 3.15 | 2.11 | 10 | 7 |
| 2 | 3.45 | 2.61 | 2.31 | 2.78 | 7 | 10 |
| 3 | 4.43 | 4.36 | 3.39 | 3.60 | 8 | 9 |
| 4 | 4.56 | 4.52 | 1.98 | 2.3 | 9 | 8 |
| 5 | 5.89 | 4.17 | 3.31 | 2.08 | 9 | 7 |
| 6 | 4.43 | 4.33 | 1.58 | 1.94 | 10 | 9 |
| 7 | 5.12 | 4.68 | 1.42 | 1.88 | 9 | 8 |
| 8 | 4.46 | 4.70 | 1.47 | 1.35 | 9 | 10 |
| 9 | 3.86 | 4.48 | 2.01 | 2.11 | 9 | 8 |
| 10 | 5.09 | 3.73 | 2.12 | 1.98 | 5 | 9 |
| 11 | 8.75 | 3.65 | 1.55 | 1.65 | 8 | 6 |
| 12 | 3.50 | 3.58 | 1.11 | 1.09 | 3 | 5 |
| 13 | 5.48 | 2.93 | 1.59 | 1.81 | 10 | 9 |
| 14 | 3.67 | 2.55 | 1.51 | 2.16 | 8 | 10 |
| 15 | 3.77 | 4.37 | 2.02 | 1.51 | 5 | 9 |
| 16 | 5.77 | 3.00 | 2.28 | 1.98 | 7 | 10 |
| 17 | 3.90 | 4.46 | 2.33 | 2.40 | 8 | 10 |
| 18 | 4.43 | 3.87 | 2.50 | 1.75 | 9 | 7 |
| 19 | 2.78 | 2.73 | 1.76 | 2.45 | 8 | 10 |
| 20 | 2.25 | 2.87 | 2.18 | 2.40 | 3 | 6 |
| 21 | 6.98 | 4.89 | 2.85 | 2.30 | 5 | 9 |
| Totals | 106.52 | 85.91 | 44.42 | 43.66 | 162 | 176 |
| Statistical Mean | 5.07 | 4.09 | 2.11 | 2.07 | 7.71 | 8.38 |

PRODUCT REVIEW

intended target, there is momentary hesitation as attention is always initially drawn to where the light is directed. This phenomenon tends to impair both scores and reaction times if the light is misdirected.

Subjects who displayed above-average proficiency with their tube lights tended to exhibit a drop-off in proficiency when using the Liberator. This observation group consisted entirely of experienced firearms instructors and this phenomenon was not unexpected. Accordingly, the 9% (average) scoring advantage enjoyed by the Liberator will likely translate into much higher scores for shooters less proficient with flashlights and handguns than the instructors that we tested.

Some subjects noted difficulty in manipulating the slides of their pistols (e.g., when charging their pistols or clearing stoppages) when wearing the Liberator. This seemed to be a complaint among shooters with smaller hands since the Liberator's palm strap tends to fill out the palm of a smaller hand, encumbering it



Conclusion

The Liberator is a professional grade product that offers unique occupational advantages. The retail price of \$199.95 may intimidate some officers but many quality flashlights are priced in that range today. Additionally, the

may be a cost effective, multi-platform alternative to weapon mounted light products. It should be noted that specialized training is available for the Liberator and that the First Light website offers several video clips that illustrate proper use of the light. When purchased, the Liberator also comes with an instructional DVD.

ADDITIONALLY, THE LIBERATOR IS A MULTI-PLATFORM PRODUCT THAT, WITH SLIGHT ADJUSTMENT OF THE LIGHT HEAD, WORKS WELL WITH RIFLES, SHOTGUNS AND SUBMACHINE GUNS.

somewhat in the process. Some improvisation of weapon manipulation technique can address this issue when it becomes manifest in officers with smaller hands.

Liberator is a multi-platform product that, with slight adjustment of the light head, works well with rifles, shotguns and submachine guns. Given what many gun-mounted lights cost, this flexibility suggests that the Liberator

Regardless of how it is ultimately deployed, the Liberator is always ready if it is always worn. That has been a common beef with conventional flashlights – if they aren't pre-deployed, they're seldom if ever employed in deadly force encounters. The Liberator addresses that issue head-on. Is it perfect? No. But one might expect that the wunderkinds at First Light will design ever more utility and wearability into this product as it evolves. In its current state of design the Liberator is more than adequately efficient and offers significant advantages over more conventional flashlight designs.

ANSWERING THE CALL

SUMMER 2007 | pg. 26

Don't Miss the Best Practices, Innovative Strategies and the Newest Techniques
for Pandemic Preparedness

Special "Answering the Call" Discount!
Register by calling 703-894-0481

The 2007 National

October 15-17, 2007
Arlington, VA

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA SUMMIT

Improve Preparedness Efforts

Assess critical needs and develop essential programs to limit the impact of a pandemic

Enhance Local Response and Agency Collaboration

Forge key partnerships with emergency response organizations to coordinate information sharing measures and resources

Improve Communication Strategies for Emerging Threats

Work with businesses, agencies and other entities to enhance public awareness of communicable diseases

Maximize Funding for Essential Needs

Accelerate preparedness and response by discovering the latest avenues to obtain funding for pandemic planning

A Comprehensive Approach
to Improving Preparedness & Response



www.PerformanceWeb.org

It takes a village:

The San Diego Approach to Sex Offender Management

Proven Strategies for Improving Collaboration and Cooperation in Sex Offender Management

By
Ian Faigley
The Performance Institute

Recently, The Performance Institute, the Leadership Against Sex Offenses Association, and SAFENOWPROJECT held a conference in San Diego on sex offender management and registration. The conference covered a wide variety of perspectives on critical issues such as monitoring the internet, community notification, and keeping children safe from predatory offenders. Representatives of law enforcement agencies from across the country were present, and many shared their successes and challenges. Of critical importance to many agencies were compliance issues with the Adam Walsh Act, effective tracking of offenders and developing comprehensive care and treatment techniques with the aid of treatment providers.

One of the major concerns for agencies was in the area of sheer capacity to handle number of former sex offenders in communities. Few agencies are set up or resourced adequately to consistently track and monitor all offenders. Amongst all the other

responsibilities law enforcement has, it is very difficult to track every single sex offender living in an entire jurisdiction, whether the jurisdiction is large or small. Some jurisdictions may have only 50-100 offenders, but only two full-time officers. Others, like San Diego, have approximately 4,000 sex offenders to attempt to keep tabs on. However, keeping tabs on an offender is not as simple as it sounds.


Depending on the regulations of the state, agencies must track and verify the address and employment of offenders. The address must be checked using GIS or other mapping techniques to ensure that the address is not located within restricted zones—such as a school or playground. Also, internet habits must be regularly examined. Neighbors and areas must be notified of dangerous or violent offenders entering their community.

All of this is impossible for law enforcement agencies to achieve on their own. They do not have the

resources or staff to manage and keep track all of these requirements, which have to be done regularly for 20 years or more in the case of some offenders. Even with full staffing and resources, people can change their names or identities or disappear off the radar screen (becoming homeless, moving to very rural areas), so operating alone is not enough. Law enforcement agencies must develop systems to work with other local agencies, service providers, attorneys, and nonprofits to provide for the tracking, treatment and rehabilitation of sex offenders, while ensuring the safety of the community at large.

In building coalitions and collaborations to achieve improved results in sex offender management, San Diego County is well ahead of the curve. A wide variety of stakeholders have come together and acknowledged the need for all parties to manage to and share resources and information. These stakeholders include police departments in several cities in the region, the County

ESSENTIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES



Sherriff's Department, the District Attorney's Office, the Public Defender, treatment providers, IT functions in law enforcement, probation/parole officers, victims' advocates, social service agencies and nonprofits. These many groups have had to acknowledge and recognize their attributes and weakness, and develop a clear and concise vision for their effort together. There are several different groups working in the area now, each overlapping and complementing the work of the others.

Phyllis Shess spoke on this topic and about the successes of the San Diego model at the recent LASO conference. A prosecutor since 1989, Ms. Shess is the Director of Sex Offender

Management for the San Diego County District Attorney's Office, the only position of its kind nationwide in a prosecutor's office. Until December 2006, she was Assistant Chief of the Sex Crimes & Stalking Division for the San Diego District Attorney's Office.

Of supreme interest to law enforcement is the SAFE task force model- Sexual Assault Felony Enforcement Task Force. Begun in San Diego in 2003, it has now expanded to all areas of California, that are broken down into six SAFE districts.

The SAFE task force was San Diego County's answer to the problem of information sharing and monitoring of sex offenders. According to Ms.

Shess, "there were multiple law enforcement agencies in the area with limited resources. It was essential for those agencies to improve their monitoring of sex offender registration compliance and enforcement to enhance community safety."

There are 11 different law enforcement agencies in greater San Diego and four government law enforcement agencies covering an area of 4,200 square miles and 18 cities. There are approximately 2.9 million people who live in the region, 4,000 of those registered sex offenders.

Those law enforcement agencies were tasked with developing a system for tracking and monitoring compliance

ESSENTIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES



with sex offender rules and regulations. Included in the task force initially were the police departments, sheriff's department, Department of Justice, California Highway Patrol, Department of Correction, FBI, DA and probation. Also invited in were the US Attorney, US Marshall, US Customs, Border Patrol, City Attorney and other interested agencies.

The SAFE team meets regularly and provides assistance to all associated agencies in the areas of registration compliance, probation/parole searches, community notifications, reentry and location of high risk sex offenders in communities, community information and education and legislative needs.

There are thirteen members of the SAFE task force. They build case files on all sex offenders in the area. There is consistent physical monitoring of offenders. All of this would be a huge burden on a single agency, but sharing responsibilities and resources allows the many responsibilities in offender

oversight to be handled efficiently, and everyone can share the case files in case there is a need to arrest and charge a former offender.

Collaboration and teamwork can be incredibly effective for law enforcement agencies in a variety of areas. The first step is to identify the exact problem your agency is having—whether it be tracking sex offender compliance, housing sex offenders, or communication. The essential next step is to identify the key stakeholders and consider their perspective on the issue. One must recognize and accept that all groups in a coalition or collaborative effort will not always see eye to eye.

The next essential step is to develop a mission statement and clear goals. Engage all stakeholders to craft this vision statement, so that everyone is involved and engaged in the process.

A difficult but important final step for the law enforcement community is to establish some way to measure

progress and success, the actual value of the coalition that you have formed. Whether it be based on the number of convictions, the number of incidents, the improved outcomes of offenders—create a baseline level that you wish your collaborative effort to achieve, and regularly evaluate the effort based on the measures you choose.

This overview and best practice study was not meant to make this process sound easy. It took San Diego many years to get this coalition in place. Buy-in and flexibility on the part of executive leadership is essential.

Criminals don't worry about jurisdictional boundaries or political infighting amongst law enforcement. On the contrary, the natural pattern of territorial boundaries in law enforcement and the lack of information sharing is an asset to criminals—whether it be a sex offender trying to slip off the monitoring network or any other type of criminal. By working together and sharing information across boundaries and agencies, law enforcement closes the gaps in their available information resources. Answering the Call applauds the work that the San Diego area agencies have done to work together to achieve common objectives.

Ian Faigley is the Director of The Performance Institute's Law Enforcement Development Center. The Center provides trainings, national conferences, on-site education, and consulting services to law enforcement and first responders nationwide. The Center works to improve management, enhance performance, and promote best-practices on issues including Homeland Security, recruitment, leadership, use of force, grant writing, and many other areas of critical concern. If you'd like more information please visit www.PerformanceWeb.org.

Law Enforcement Recruitment & Retention Summit 2007

Aligning Your Department's Recruiting, Retention and Development Efforts
to Create a Quality Workforce

Attract and Develop Top Law Enforcement Talent

Learn to reach your target law enforcement recruit base
for your agency

Increase Your Law Enforcement Agency's Retention Rates

Hire and retain quality personnel to create an
optimal work environment and strengthen all-around
organizational quality

Implement Successful Strategies to Attract High Quality Applicants

Utilize strategies and practices identified by leading law
enforcement organizations

Equip Yourself and Your Agency with Tested Retention Strategies

Guarantee that your agency establishes adequate training
and succession planning to retain your best employees

Special
"Answering the Call"
Discount!

Register by calling
703-894-0481



officer.com
The Source for Law Enforcement



THE PARTING SHOT

Dear Law Enforcement Colleague:

Thanks for taking the time to read this second edition of Answering the Call. We hope you enjoyed the articles, and will use some of the ideas and lessons learned contained within. We work with first responders from across the country regularly to ensure the most current and essential is delivered through these pages every issue.

We have heard from many of you since the first edition, and many of your ideas and suggestions have been used to improve the impact and effectiveness of this publication. We welcome case studies, ideas and input you have, which we will feature in the "Comments from the Field" section. Please send anything you feel your colleagues in the first responder and law enforcement communities will benefit from. To submit your ideas, please contact Ian Faigley at Faigley@PerformanceWeb.org or by mail at:

The Performance Institute, attn Ian Faigley
1515 N. Courthouse Rd. Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22201

Answering the Call represents a joint publication of the Performance Institute's Law Enforcement Development Center and the Police Policy Studies Council. For more information about the Performance Institute, upcoming events and training opportunities, please visit www.PerformanceWeb.org. For more information regarding the Police Policy Studies Council and upcoming trainings, please visit www.theppsc.org. The PPSC website also features an interactive forum where you can dialogue with your peers and experts on a wide variety of issues affecting law enforcement and the first response community.

Until next time!

The Police Policy Studies Council Would Like to Thank:



What kinds of information will I find on the website Officer.com?

officer.com The Source for Law Enforcement

- The latest news in law enforcement, updated several times each business day by a dedicated news staff
- New feature articles every day on topics ranging from officer survival to police family life
- All articles written by subject matter experts, most of them active or retired law enforcement officers
- Comprehensive job listings for both sworn and non-sworn positions
- A discussion forum with over 38,000 registered members
- An events calendar of training sessions, fund-raisers, social gatherings, and other events with no listing fees
- Archives of all articles appearing in Law Enforcement Technology magazine
- Free e-mail bulletins of daily news and feature articles, officer down reports, and new job listings
- Free yourname@officermail.com e-mail accounts
- Web directories of law enforcement agencies and online resources for police

Officer.com does its best to live up to our motto, "The Source for Law Enforcement." From this page, a mouse click or two will bring you the latest news, job listings, ongoing discussions on every topic of interest to police, and original articles, available nowhere else, all written by our carefully selected contributors. No one writes for Officer.com unless they have walked the walk and know what they're writing about first hand. Each article and news story is written for the busy professional who doesn't have a lot of time to read, so we get to the good stuff right away. If you've got five minutes until your next meeting or to finish your coffee before you go back on the road, call up the Officer.com home page and we'll have something there that you'll find at least interesting, and hopefully valuable. Roll call sergeants can always find an article or news story to use as the foundation for a few minutes of in-service training.

Officer.com is the only online resource you need to keep informed and ready to deal with the next incident you are called to handle, on the job or in your home life.

officer.com
The Source for Law Enforcement

www.officer.com

UPCOMING POLICE POLICY STUDIES COUNCIL COURSES:

| Course | Tuition | Location | Date |
|--|---------------|---------------|-----------------|
| Deadly Misconceptions Seminar For more information, contact training@theppsc.org | 8 hours/\$150 | Nashville, TN | August 15, 2007 |

New courses are being added for online registration - please visit <http://www.theppsc.org/Services/Courses/Main.htm> for the latest schedule



UPCOMING PERFORMANCE INSTITUTE COURSES:

| Course | Location | Date |
|---|---------------|---------------|
| The 2007 National Summit on Campus Security | Arlington, VA | July 30-31 |
| The 2007 National Summit on Recruitment and Retention of Paramedics | Arlington, VA | August 9-10 |
| The 2007 Homeland Security Summit | Arlington, VA | September 5-7 |
| The 2007 National Pandemic Influenza Summit | Arlington, VA | October 15-17 |
| The 2007 National Summit on Use of Force in Law Enforcement | Arlington, VA | November 1-2 |
| Law Enforcement Recruitment & Retention Summit 2007 | San Diego, CA | December 5-6 |

New courses are being added for online registration - please visit www.PerformanceWeb.org/LE for the latest schedule

The Law Enforcement Development Center

The Law Enforcement Development Center (LEDC) at The Performance Institute promotes excellence in the law enforcement, first responder, public health and homeland security communities by analyzing and releasing best practices and performance-based methodologies to solve managerial and operational challenges.

Sign up for the LEDC's free newsletter today at PerformanceWeb.org/Newsletter

